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Abstract 
“Metacognitive theories,” an article Gregg Schraw and I published in Educational 
Psychology Review in 1995, has been cited in over a thousand scholarly publica-
tions. In this follow-up, dedicated to Gregg and written after his recent death, I pro-
vide a brief overview of our 1995 article and then reflect on it in four ways. First, 
I consider the development of the concept of metacognition prior to 1995, includ-
ing its emergence and use in previous writings by each co-author. Then, I turn to 
the collaboration itself, including the interplay of complementary conceptions and 
the construction of new ideas. Third, I consider the article’s citation history and the 
role it has played in the subsequent literature. Finally, I discuss research on meta-
cognition since 1995, including subsequent work on epistemic cognition by each of 
the co-authors. 
Keywords: Metacognition, Self-regulation, Epistemic cognition, Metacognitive the-
ories, Collaborative theorizing 
In September 2016, I was shocked to learn of the death of Gregg 
Schraw. Gregg had been my colleague in the University of Nebraska-
Lincoln (UNL) Educational Psychology Department from 1990 until 
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2000, when he moved to the University of Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV). 
I had not seen him in years but had been meaning to contact him about 
the fact that “Metacognitive theories,” an article we had co-authored 
in 1995 (Schraw and Moshman 1995), was on track to reach 1000 cita-
tions in the next few months. I thought we might collaborate on some 
sort of follow-up, reflecting on our earlier collaboration and the role 
of the resulting article in the literature. 
I heard about Gregg’s death from Matt McCrudden. Matt subse-
quently invited me to contribute a brief remembrance to a collection 
of appreciations he was editing (McCrudden 2016) and also encour-
aged me to write the longer article I had in mind.   
Here, I provide a brief overview of the 1995 article and then reflect 
on it in four ways. First, I consider the development of the concept 
of metacognition prior to 1995, including its use in previous separate 
writings by Gregg and by me. Second, I focus on the collaboration it-
self, including the interplay of complementary conceptions and the 
construction of new ideas. Third, I consider the article’s citation his-
tory, including some analysis of how it was cited over the years. Fi-
nally, I consider research on metacognition since 1995, focusing es-
pecially on Gregg’s subsequent work and some of my own, noting in 
particular our independent emphasis on epistemic cognition. 
I dedicate this article to Gregg and wish we could have written it 
together. 
Overview of “Metacognitive Theories” 
Metacognitive theories are defined in the abstract of “Metacognitive 
theories” as “systematic frameworks used to explain and direct cog-
nition, metacognitive knowledge, and regulatory skills.” After a brief 
introduction, the article proceeds in four parts. 
The first part of the article provides a synthesis of the literature 
on metacognition. This is neither a comprehensive review of empir-
ical findings nor a systematic overview of theoretical controversies 
or positions. Rather, the aim is to identify and systematize a consen-
sus taxonomy within which theoretical discussion and empirical re-
search can proceed. 
A basic distinction is made between “knowledge of cognition” 
(i.e., “metacognitive knowledge”) and “regulation of cognition” (i.e., 
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“metacognitive control processes”). Knowledge of cognition “refers to 
what individuals know about their own cognition or about cognition 
in general.” This consists of declarative knowledge (knowing about 
things), procedural knowledge (knowing how to do things), and con-
ditional knowledge (knowing why and when). Regulation of cognition 
“refers to metacognitive activities that help control one’s thinking or 
learning.” Three “essential” and widely recognized regulatory skills 
are planning (selection of strategies and allocation of resources), mon-
itoring (“on-line awareness of comprehension and task performance”), 
and evaluation (“appraising the products and regulatory processes of 
one’s learning”). 
The second part of the article introduces the concept of metacog-
nitive theories, which are defined as “theories that integrate one’s 
knowledge about cognition and regulation of cognition.” That is, a 
metacognitive theory is “a relatively systematic structure of knowl-
edge that can be used to explain and predict a broad range of cognitive 
and metacognitive phenomena.” Metacognitive theories are “a distinct 
and important subset of metacognitive knowledge” in that they “inte-
grate a wide range of metacognitive knowledge and experiences” and 
“permit explanation and prediction of cognitive behavior.” 
Three types of metacognitive theory are proposed. Tacit theories 
“are those acquired or constructed without any explicit awareness 
that one possesses a theory.” Informal theories are to some degree ex-
plicit but still fragmentary, with “emerging recognition and control 
of constructive processes.” Formal theories are “highly systematized 
accounts … involving explicit theoretical structures.” The ordering of 
the three types accurately suggests a developmental sequence, but for-
mal theories are associated less with age than with advanced educa-
tion and expertise. 
The third section “explores in more detail the origins of metacogni-
tive theories.” It suggests that “cultural learning, individual construc-
tion, and peer interaction all play important roles in the emergence of 
metacognitive theories” and that “their influence is interactive rather 
than simply additive.” It particularly highlights the role of peer inter-
action as a “process of social construction that differs in part from 
both cultural transmission and individual construction.” 
The final section considers implications for assessment and educa-
tion. It acknowledges the great challenge of developing “methodolo-
gies for detecting and representing people’s metacognitive theories.” 
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It argues that although “many effective educational programs” pro-
vide students with “metacognitive knowledge and regulatory skills,” 
many “fall short of helping students (a) to understand the structure 
of theories, and (b) to use theories to systematize self-knowledge and 
apply that knowledge to self-regulation.” After suggesting some poten-
tial approaches, the article notes that some degree of metacognitive 
theorizing is possible “from the time a child enters school regardless 
of his or her skill level” and concludes that “schools should actively 
promote metacognitive theorizing among all students.” 
Metacognition: The Concept and the Term 
The concept underlying what we now call “metacognition” is very old 
and diffuse, with complex and inconsistent terminology. Overlapping 
concepts include reflection, attribution, perspective taking, and the-
ory of mind (Miller 2012; Tarricone 2011). 
John Flavell and Ann Brown are commonly credited with creating 
the modern terminology and conceptualization of metacognition in the 
late 1970s. The new trend was noted and consolidated in a classic ar-
ticle by Flavell (1979). Both were cited in our article, as were Deanna 
Kuhn and Michael Pressley, also major early contributors. 
We began our 1995 article with this sentence: “Hardly anyone ques-
tions the reality or importance of metacognition.” That may seem a 
bold claim, given that the term “metacognition” had been in use for 
less than two decades, but I believe it was and remains accurate. The 
field of metacognition was already growing rapidly and has contin-
ued to do so. Pina Tarricone’s (2011) The Taxonomy of Metacognition 
documents the extraordinary conceptual scope and complexity of the 
field, which continues to expand. 
Gregg came to Nebraska in 1990, having just completed his Ph.D. 
in educational psychology. By 1995, he had already established him-
self as a productive researcher with strong interests in both theory 
and assessment. He brought both of these interests to his early work 
on metacognition. One theme of his research was the complex rela-
tion of metacognitive knowledge to cognitive self-regulation (Schraw 
1994). A related concern was whether self-regulation is to some de-
gree a general skill applicable across domains. Without denying that 
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metacognition is to some degree domain-specific, Gregg and students 
provided empirical evidence and theoretical arguments for the ex-
istence and importance of a general monitoring skill (Schraw et al. 
1995). On the assessment side, Gregg and a student developed an in-
ventory to assess metacognitive awareness (Schraw and Dennison 
1994). His collaborations with graduate students were already draw-
ing many to the field of metacognition. 
My early work as a developmental psychology graduate student in 
the 1970s concerned scientific reasoning, which I saw, from a Piag-
etian perspective, in metacognitive terms, even before that became 
the standard language. This work led to an invitation from Deanna 
Kuhn to contribute a chapter to a small volume she was editing enti-
tled, Intellectual development beyond childhood. Citing a recent article 
entitled, “If you want to get ahead, get a theory,” which showed that 
children use theories (to varying extents) to guide empirical inquiry 
(Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974–1975), I argued that adolescents 
(to varying extents) use metatheoretical knowledge to guide their the-
orizing. I called my chapter, “To really get ahead, get a metatheory” 
(Moshman 1979). 
In the 1980s, turning to logical reasoning, I studied the develop-
ment of fundamental conceptions about the nature of logic, such as va-
lidity of inference as a logical property of arguments distinct from the 
truth of premises and conclusions (Moshman and Franks 1986). Such 
conceptions, I argued, develop through reflective processes that gener-
ate a universal sequence of metalogical stages, each an explicit recon-
struction of the logic implicit in the previous stage (Moshman 1990). 
In the early 1990s, I turned to more general analyses of reasoning 
and rationality, including the crucial role of metacognition. Continu-
ing at first to use the term “reasoning” broadly to include automatic 
processes, I initially proposed the term “metareasoning” to distinguish 
reasoning that is guided by metacognition (Moshman 1994a). Sub-
stantially reconsidering my conceptualization and terminology, how-
ever, I soon reconceived reasoning, in contrast to automatic inference, 
as intrinsically metacognitive (Moshman 1995). This was associated 
with formulating a constructivist account of rationality as “metasu-
bjective objectivity” (Moshman 1994b). As our collaboration began, I 
had been working with metacognitive terms and concepts for two de-
cades but had not contributed as directly as Gregg to the mainstream 
literature on metacognition. 
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Collaborative Theorizing 
Despite our rather different theoretical backgrounds, Gregg and I read-
ily found common ground in our thinking about metacognition. Gregg 
was much more familiar than I was with the educational psychology 
literature, which highlighted individual differences, measurement, 
and the learning of metacognitive skills, but I was in general agree-
ment with his interpretations of that literature. Correspondingly, I 
was much more familiar with the developmental psychology litera-
ture, which highlighted questions of long-term qualitative change in 
metacognitive knowledge and associated self-regulation, but Gregg 
was in general agreement with my metacognitive conceptualization 
of developmental processes and outcomes. After I recommended Rob-
ert Campbell and Mark Bickhard’s monograph on the reflective con-
struction of developmental stages (Campbell and Bickhard 1986), he 
said it had the most influence on his thinking of anything he ever read. 
Thus, it seemed that we were theoretically compatible but different 
enough in expertise and theoretical background to complement each 
other well. Our collaboration on a broad conceptualization of meta-
cognition could be expected to yield a product that was at least the 
sum of our expertise, and perhaps something more. 
The “something more” that provided the basis for the article 
was our collaborative conceptualization of advanced metacognitive 
knowledge as metacognitive theories. The conception of knowledge 
as organized into theories came from the developmental literature, 
where knowledge is routinely conceptualized as theoretical in nature 
(Karmiloff-Smith and Inhelder 1974–1975) and concepts such as the-
ory of mind (Miller 2012) have long played a central role. The appli-
cation of that conception to the rich educational psychology literature 
on metacognitive knowledge and self-regulation was made possible by 
Gregg’s broad and sophisticated grasp of that literature. 
Our collaboration moved slowly at first because we were both busy 
with other projects and responsibilities. Then, in March 1993, I re-
ceived a letter from Steve Benton, editor of Educational Psychology 
Review. Having taken responsibility for the young journal after the 
tragic death of its founding editor John Glover, he was soliciting new 
contributions. He specifically invited me to plan and edit a special is-
sue on constructivism. I responded in April 1993 that I would prefer 
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to send Steve the result of the substantial project on metacognition 
that I was working on with Gregg, whom I described as “my neighbor 
across the hall.” That was fine with Steve, so Gregg and I stepped up 
the pace of our writing and editing, though it still took many months 
to complete and submit the manuscript. 
It would make this story more interesting if I could report that 
shortsighted reviewers, in their ignorance and arrogance, failed to see 
the merit of our work and needlessly complicated the route to publica-
tion. Those reviewers, I might have hoped, would see the present arti-
cle and regret their evil ways. But, actually, the anonymous reviewers 
for Educational Psychology Review were very positive and their sug-
gestions for revision, which we received in June 1994, were entirely 
reasonable. The revised manuscript was accepted for publication in 
November 1994, contingent on some final minor revisions, and was 
published in the final issue of 1995. 
Citation History 
As of April 2017, according to Google Scholar, “Metacognitive theo-
ries” had been cited over 1100 times. Annual figures showed that the 
citation rate had increased steadily over the years from 4 citations in 
1997 (the first year it was cited) to 13 in 2001 to 28 in 2005 to 50 in 
2009 to over 100 citations in 2013 and each year since. 
Examination of specific citations shows that, since the beginning, 
the article has been cited not only in journals and books in the field 
of educational psychology, as would be expected, but also regularly 
in other areas of psychology, especially cognitive and developmental 
psychology, and other areas of education, especially science educa-
tion. Geographically, the article has been cited in nations spanning the 
globe. About 30% of the citations each year have been in journals or 
books published in languages other than English. Dozens of languages, 
most of which I cannot recognize, are represented, with no single lan-
guage accounting for more than a small proportion of these citations. 
“Metacognitive theories” presented itself as a “framework for un-
derstanding people’s theories about their own cognition.” It provided 
no new data. Its proposal that people have metacognitive theories, far 
from being a bold new theory, was formulated in a manner inclusive 
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of earlier theories and research and thus was not controversial. The 
article was largely a consensus framework for conceptualizing the lit-
erature in a way that served as a basis for further research, includ-
ing further theorizing. It has been commonly cited (often along with 
other publications such as Flavell 1979) as a taxonomy within which 
researchers can efficiently place their own research or a source of au-
thoritative definitions and distinctions to get them started in review-
ing the literature or providing theoretical interpretations. 
Subsequent Research 
After the publication of “Metacognitive theories,” Gregg and I began 
work on a potential follow-up, originally entitled “Constructing meta-
cognitive theories.” In spring 1996, Deanna Kuhn contacted me about 
the possibility of organizing a symposium on metacognition for the 
spring 1997 meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development 
in Washington, D.C. After I talked with Gregg about that, he took the 
lead in organizing the symposium, which ultimately included, in addi-
tion to Gregg’s presentation of our work, presentations by Kuhn, John 
Flavell, and Michael Pressley, with Robert Campbell as discussant. 
Although we continued our work after the SRCD symposium, we 
never completed a manuscript for submission to a journal. The main 
problem was the increasing scope, complexity, and theoretical ambi-
tion of the project, which expanded to include multiple types of knowl-
edge, levels of knowledge, constructive processes, and educational 
contexts. Although each of these four dimensions was distinct from 
the others, they were not entirely orthogonal and the potential inter-
actions increasingly boggled our minds. We worried that our draft 
manuscript, written mostly by Gregg, was growing beyond what most 
journals would be willing to publish. I do not recall that we ever made 
a decision to stop working on this but we each had other demands on 
our attention. 
And so we went our separate ways, academically and geographi-
cally. Gregg’s work in the late 1990s continued to reflect his general 
interest and expertise in measurement and his specific concern for im-
proving assessment in the rapidly advancing study of metacognition 
(Schraw and Impara 2000). In addition, continuing his earlier work 
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on domain-generality, he and a student also provided substantial fur-
ther evidence that learners, to varying degrees, use domain-general 
metacognitive knowledge to monitor their comprehension (Schraw 
and Nietfeld 1998). And, further, arguing that metacognitive knowl-
edge is multidimensional, domain-general, and teachable, he directly 
addressed the promotion of metacognition (Schraw 1998). 
In 2000, Gregg left for UNLV, where he spent the rest of his highly 
productive career. He continued to publish on the measurement of 
metacognition, especially with regard to metacognitive monitoring 
and calibration (Schraw 2009a, b; Schraw et al. 2013). He also con-
tinued his work on the promotion of metacognition in education, in-
cluding science education (Schraw et al. 2006). Much of his later work 
concerned epistemological beliefs (more on this below). 
Gregg was also the co-author, with Roger Bruning and others, of 
multiple editions of a highly successful text applying cognitive psy-
chology to education (Bruning et al. 2011). No such text could possi-
bly avoid addressing metacognition, but this one, no doubt reflecting 
Gregg’s influence, provides exceptional coverage throughout of meta-
cognitive awareness and self-regulation, especially in relation to stra-
tegic and effective learning. It also includes an entire chapter on the 
role of students’ and teachers’ beliefs about matters of intelligence 
and knowledge. 
My work after 1995 continued to focus on the development of rea-
soning and rationality, especially in adolescence and beyond, and the 
promotion of such development. Metacognition continued to be cen-
tral in my conceptions of reasoning, rationality, and developmental 
progress. My adolescent development text highlighted metacognition 
throughout. The expanded third edition (Moshman 2011) devoted a 
chapter to “Metacognition and Epistemic Cognition.” 
Perhaps the most important trend in the study of metacognition 
since 1995 has been the extraordinary increase in interest, especially 
within educational psychology, in advanced forms of metacognition 
variously referred to as “epistemological beliefs,” “personal epistemol-
ogies,” or “epistemic cognition.” I cannot speak for Gregg but I think 
he would have agreed; his later work focused increasingly on episte-
mological beliefs and personal epistemologies (Brownlee et al. 2011; 
Olafson and Schraw 2010; Schraw et al. 2002). Both of us contributed 
to the 2016 Handbook of Epistemic Cognition (Brownlee et al. 2016; 
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Moshman and Tarricone 2016), which valiantly attempts to capture 
the rapidly emerging theories, methods, and research findings in this 
area and to promote further progress. 
Gregg’s work on epistemic cognition strongly reflected his exper-
tise and ongoing interest in measurement (Olafson and Schraw 2010; 
Schrawet al. 2002). Substantively, much of his later research con-
cerned the epistemological worldviews of teachers, including indi-
vidual differences, changes over time, and the relation of such world-
views to teaching practices (Brownlee et al. 2016; Olafson and Schraw 
2010). 
My own recent work on epistemic cognition has been mostly theo-
retical, critical, and integrative. As the various strands of epistemolog-
ical study and discussion proliferated, I became increasingly concerned 
that the emerging literature was diffuse and incoherent. “Epistemol-
ogy” and related terms are used so vaguely and variously across di-
verse theories and research programs that they often provide little 
more than fancy new ways to talk about metacognition. The main fo-
cus of my own work in this area has been to provide a coherent syn-
thesis of its diverse literatures, beginning with a definition of epis-
temic cognition as “knowledge about matters of epistemology—that 
is, knowledge about the justification and truth of beliefs” (Moshman 
2015). 
Conclusion 
This article about the article “Metacognitive theories” can be consid-
ered “meta” to “metacognitive theories.” Although “Meta-metacogni-
tive theories” seems awkward and ambiguous to me, I seriously con-
sidered calling this article “Metacognitive metatheories.” I liked the 
sound of that but decided against it because this too seemed ambigu-
ous and perhaps too mysterious or too cute. Gregg might have agreed. 
Alternatively, he might have liked “metacognitive metatheories,” ex-
plained what it meant, and convinced me to go with it. Unfortunately, 
I will never know, unless there is an alternate universe in which he 
and I write this article together. 
Gregg was always a pleasure to work with, as many have noted 
(McCrudden 2016). He was unfailingly supportive of students and 
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colleagues and strongly committed to the field of educational psychol-
ogy. He never doubted that better metacognitive theories are widely 
attainable and good for everyone. This would have been a better ar-
ticle had he been able to co-author it with me — and much more fun 
to write. 
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